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The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, in Chapter III, 
referring to the federate States, says: 
Art. 25. The States are organized and governed by the 
Constitutions and laws they may adopt, in accordance with 
the principles of this Constitution. 
Paragraph 1. All powers that this Constitution does not 
prohibit the States from exercising shall be conferred upon 
them. 
All Brazilian Constitutions and constitutional Charters state, 
with slight semantic differences, what was expressed in the Constitution of 
1891: 
Art. 63. Each State governs itself according to the 
Constitution and the laws it adopts, respecting the 
constitutional principles of the Union. 
..................................................................................… 
Art. 65  It is left to the States: 
..................................................................................... 
Paragraph 2.  in general, each and every power or right, that 
is not expressly denied or implicitly contained in the written 
clauses of the Constitution. 
In reading this Brazilian constitutional device of decisions left 
to the States, one would never imagine the great number of political and 
judicial battles behind it, battles waged in the United States of America 
during the forming of their Confederation (1777), of their Federation 
(1787), and the ratification of their first  ten Amendments (1791). 
A11  
* Aposentado do cargo de Ministro do Superior Tribunal de Justiça a partir de 
13/11/1998. 





There is no doubt that the idea of a Federal State is a creation 
of the North-Americans, as was observed by García-Pelayo1 and Machado 
Horta2. However, if the concept of a Confederation (Staatenbund) is 
simple, the same cannot be said of the “Federal State” (Bundesstaat), a 
more complex entity to define.3 At its foundation, the judicial concept of a 
federal State revolves around the issue of “sovereignty”, an idea which 
has been deformed and modified since the days of Jean Bodin (1530–
1596).4 Bodin himself, in speaking of summa potestas (Les Six Livres de 
la République), referred more to the idea of monarchy than of a federal 
State.5 The idea of sovereignty, classically considered an essential 
element of the State,6 lost its absolute indivisible nature, giving way, 
according to the studies of Laband and Jellinek, to domination.7 Laband 
and Jellinek affirmed that if a territorial community (Gemeinschaft) has 
the conditions to organize itself politically, maintaining the power of 
domination (Herrschaft), this community can be considered a State, even 
if it doesn’t possess its own sovereignty (Souveränität). This doctrine, 
though criticized like many others, would serve to explain the North-
                                                 
1 “El Estado Federal hace su entrada en la Historia con la Constitución americana de 
1787” (GARCÍA-PELAYO, Manuel. Derecho constitucional comparado. 2. ed. Madrid: 
Manuales de la Revista de Occidente, 1951, p. 198). 
2 HORTA, Raul Machado. Estudos de direito constitucional. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 1995, 
p. 346. 
3 Cf. CARRÉ DE MALBERG, R. Teoría general del estado. Spanish version by José Lion 
Depetre. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, p. 103. According to GARCÍA-PELAYO 
(work cited., p. 199), it was the German authors that distinguished, with precision, the 
word “federation” (Bundesstaat) from  a “confederation” (Staatenbund). In The Federalist  
-  the observation is still his -  “federal” is used in place of confederation and “national” in 
place of “single state” (ibidem, p. 198). 
4 Bodin, in the Latin version of his book  Les six livres de la République, uses summa 
potestas for sovereignty (cf. CARRÉ DE MALBERG, work cited, p. 85). The first to 
conceptualize “sovereignty” was Jean Bodin (cf.  JELLINEK, Georg. Teoria general del 
estado. Spanish version by  Fernando de los Rios. Montevideo: B de F Ltda., 2005. p. 
563). 
5 Cf. CARRÉ DE MALBERG, work cited., p. 87. 
6 WILLOUGHBY, Westel W. (Principles of the constitutional law of the United States. 2. 
ed. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co, 1938, p. 8) criticizes those that admit the divisibility 
of sovereignty, which is the essence of the State. Seeks to make a distinction between 
State and Government. Adds: “Though the sovereign will of State may not be divided, it 
may find expression through several legislatives mouthpieces, and the execution of its 
commands may be delegated to a variety of governmental agencies). 
7 Cf. CARRÉ DE MALBERG, work cited., p. 152, 157, 158. Cf. JELLINEK, work cited., p. 
255. 





American Federation and subsequently the Brazilian Federation of 1891, 
where simple provinces were, by decree of a revolutionary government, 
transformed overnight into “State-members.”8 
After the American proclamation of Independence (1776), the 
thirteen new “countries”, former English colonies, affirmed on November 
15, 1977 an international treaty, creating the Confederation of the United 
States of America. (art. I). This document, that for many is the first 
American constitution, declares in art. II: 
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every Power, jurisdiction and right, which 
is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the 
United States, in Congress assembled.9 
In 1780, shortly before the ratification of the before-
mentioned treaty (the Articles of Confederation on March 1, 1781), 
Alexander Hamilton had already idealized the transformation of the 
Confederation into a new form of government, one that would not contain 
the political vagaries and the administrative torment of the recently 
formed Confederation. 
As Pontes de Miranda observed,10 when creating a new 
political entity one would do well to choose as its foundational statute the 
idea that any powers or rights left unenumerated would be reserved for 
the bigger entity. In the American case, Hamilton knew beforehand that 
any attempt to reserve these powers for a central entity (the United 
States) would cause future members of the convention (constituents) to 
                                                 
8 BRAZIL. The Federal Constitution of  1891, in its art. 2, establishes: “Each of the 
Provinces should form a State and the former Neutral District will constitute the Federal 
District, ...” The current Constitution (1988), in art. 1.º, linked the Municipality to the 
condition of membership in the Federation: “Art. 1. The Federal Republic of Brazil, 
formed by the indivisible union of the States and Municipalities and of the Federal 
District...”. 
9 COMMAGER, Henry S (Ed.). Documents of American history. 6. ed. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958, p. 111. 
10 Comentários à constituição de 1946. 4. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Editor Borsoi, 1963, t. II, p. 
154. 





be wary of joining the Confederation.11 The Federalists knew the 
Confederation was debilitated, that it would not last. Even George 
Washington viewed the Confederation with doubt: “little more than a 
shadow without the substance.”12 Hamilton, Madison and Washington 
believed in a national government, with stronger ties, even at the expense 
of freedom for the people.13 At Madison’s initiative, delegates from 
Virginia and Maryland met in Mount Vernon and Alexandria in 1785 to 
study and discuss questions related to commerce and navigation of 
common interests. They scheduled another meeting to take place in 
Annapolis the next year (1786). The objective of the second meeting 
would be the same: a common commerce for the diverse Confederate 
States. Representatives from just five states showed up. Hamilton, 
representing the State of New York, convinced the delegates to meet 
again the next summer in Philadelphia. In May of 1787, with the exception 
of representatives of Rhode Island, delegates from each of the States 
convened. The representatives of Virginia, who had arrived first, proposed 
a plan (“The Virginia Plan”) to draw up a new document (a Constitution) 
creating a central government. The legislative body would be formed 
according to the population of each participating State. The least-
populated States presented a different plan (“The New Jersey Plan”): the 
Articles of Confederation would be maintained, but with profound changes. 
The legislative body would be one chamber14, with equal representation 
for each state. In the end, to Hamilton’s chagrin, there was a compromise 
between the two proposals: the legislative body would become two-
                                                 
11 Cf. WOOD, Gordon S. The creation of the American republic: 1776-1787. New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1972, p. 532. 
12 SCHWARTZ, Bernard. The bill of rights: a documentary history. New York: Chelsea 
House Publishers, in association with Hill Book Company, 1971, v. 1, p. 435. 
13 For scholars like George Bancroft and John Fiske, the Constitution was the realization 
of the Revolution; for others, like Charles Beard and Merril Jensen, the document of 1787 
was the product of an egotistical plutocracy, a coup d´état of the democratic ideals 
affirmed in the Declaration of Independence (cf.  SELLERS, Charles, MAY, Henry, 
McMILLEN, Neil R. Uma reavaliação da história dos Estados Unidos. Translation by Ruy 
Jungmann. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 1990, p. 142). 
14 The idea of a one-chamber legislative body came from  Instrument of Government, a 
document presented to the English Parliament by the officials of the army of Oliver 
Cromwell. 





chamber, with one chamber formed according to the population of the 
State-members (House of Representatives) and the other chamber 
consisting of an equal number (two) of representatives from each State 
(the Senate). Thus, the American Federation was born. 
Since the majority of the constituents of 1787 feared a central 
government, they opted for the technique of “enumerated powers”: that 
which fell under the control of the new political entity (the United States) 
would be specifically expressed in the Political Statute; that which was not 
expressly covered or prohibited would be left to each State to decide. 
However, as Willoughby covered, 
Though the Federal Government is one of enumerated 
powers, its powers are not described in detail, and from the 
very beginning it had  been held to possess, not simply 
those powers that are specifically or expressly given it, but 
also those necessary and proper for the effective exercise of 
such express powers.15 
Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution detailed, one by one, 
the “Powers of Congress”, or in other words, the powers of the national 
government. Continuing on the theme of powers and rights, the 
Constitution, in paragraph 10, prohibits or reserves for the States certain 
legislative fields. In the last directive of Section 8 in the same Article (I), 
however, the Constitution opens a door in favor of the Union: 
(The Congress shall have power) To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.16 
This directive, or as the Americans prefer to call it, this 
“clause”, refers to the idea of Implied Powers and is meant to strengthen 
                                                 
15 WILLOUGHBY, work cited., p. 54.  In the same way, the observation of Thomas 
COOLEY (The general principles of constitutional law. 4. ed. Boston:  Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1931, p. 133). 
16 The constitution of the United States of America. Washington, DC: National Archives 
and Records Administration, 1986, p. 9. 





the national government, helping to avoid infighting between its 
components.  
In 1791, sealing a commitment between the federalists 
(proponents of a strong central government) and the non-federalists 
(proponents of autonomy for the States), the ten Amendments of the 
Constitution (the Bill of Rights) were ratified. Amendment n. 10, following 
the same legislative technique of Article IX of the Article of Confederation, 
is intimately linked to Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution. 
Amendment n. 10 says: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved 
to the states respectively, or to the people. 
In this way Amendment n. 10 functioned to counterbalance 
the weight of the Union. The political genius of John Marshall, then Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court (1801-1835), however, understood the 
value of Hamilton’s argument17 and pulled the “Federalist Spirit” from the 
viscera of the Constitution and its Amendments. Two clauses gave support 
to his thesis: the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. 
About Dormant Clause”, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky clarifies that 
Congress could invalidate any state or local law that it deems to place an 
undue burden on interstate commerce.18 Professor Laurence Tribe,19 in 
turn, reminds that the true potential of the Commerce Clause was 
revealed in 1824, with Gibbons v. Ogden. Marshall, in this judgment, gives 
an elastic meaning to the word “commerce”. Commerce, without a doubt, 
                                                 
17 SCHWARTZ, Bernard. A history of the supreme court. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p. 46. 
18 CHEMERINSKY, Erwin. Constitutional law:  principles and policies. New York: Aspens 
Law & Business, 1997, p. 308-9. 
19 TRIBE, Laurence H. God save this honorable court:  how the choice of supreme court 
shapes our history. New York: New American Library, 1986, p. 26. 





is exchange, but it is much more: it is interchange, including the 
interchange of people.20 
The Supremacy Clause of the Union, in turn, means that, in 
case of a divergence between federal law and state or municipal law, the 
federal law would prevail.21 
An initial problem, in terms of a conflict of scope, arose at the 
creation of a second national bank.22 The Constitution, in directive 8 of 
Art. I, did not explicitly give power to Congress to create the bank. The 
anti-federalists argued against its creation by the federal government, 
stating that corporations could only be instituted by the states. But facts 
and logic were on the side of the federalists... If it was up to the central 
government to declare war, keep peace, produce money and contract 
lending, etc, then it made sense that the creation of a bank fell under its 
scope. In 1816, the President of the Republic (Madison) approved the 
creation of the Second Bank of the United States. Some states, however, 
revolted and taxed the federal bank for the right to operate in their 
territories, which increased the expenses of the federal bank.23 One 
cashier of the federal bank in Baltimore, Maryland, James William 
McCulloch, refused to collect the taxes demanded by the state 
government, giving rise to the McCulloch case, brought to judgment in 
1819. Marshall affirmed then the principle of federal supremacy: “The 
federal government emanates from the people, not from the States.” 
                                                 
20 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190 (1824).  See FRIEDMAN, Lawrence M. A 
history of American law. 3. ed. New York: A Touchstone Book, 2005, p. 191. 
21 Art. 24 of Brazilian Constitution of 1988 establishes concurrent scope between the 
Union, the States and the Municipalities. In § 4.º,  it says that federal legislation “under 
normal conditions suspends the efficacy of state law, if the two are contrary”. 
22 The First Bank of the United States closed its doors in 1811. From then on it is called 
Second Bank (1816). There were many misunderstandings between Hamilton (secretary 
of the Treasury)  and Jefferson (secretary of State), both secretaries of President George 
Washington.  Hamilton, in proposing the creation of First Bank,  based it on a plan by 
Charles Montague, from England shortly after the Revolution of 1688. Jefferson alleged 
that a national bank, as proposed, would be a glut of jobs, lead to corruption and  
sacrifice the ideals of Independence (cf. BERAN, Michael Knox. Jefferson’s demons. New 
York: Free Press, 2003, p. 124). 
23 Cf. NOWAK, John E., ROTUNDA, Ronald D. Principles of constitutional law. 3. ed.  St. 
Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2007, p. 68. 





Everything that agrees with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution 
was constitutional.24 To support his thesis, Marshall inferred from the 
topical position of necessary and proper clause, which follows soon after 
that of enumerated powers...25 In the actual case, since there was a 
conflict between state regulations and the federal, the federal regulations 
prevailed. In legal terms, the ideals of the Supremacy Clause grew ever 
firmer.26 As Professor Charles D. Cole of Samford University makes clear, 
the legal implications of McCulloch lasted until the Civil War (1861-1865). 
From the end of the Civil War (1865) until 1937, the Supreme Court 
developed a thesis of substantive due process in terms of economy and 
individual liberties, which resulted in a narrowing of Marshall’s 
interpretation. However, beginning with Roosevelt’s first term (1933-
1937), the Supreme Court returned to the doctrine of McCulloch v. 
Maryland.27 
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